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Knowledge and Identity: A Review 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the literature in a number of areas that converge upon the theme of 
the role of knowledge within professional identity.  Within knowledge transfer 
literature the individual perspective is underdeveloped and this paper seeks to 
contribute by exploring the function of knowledge within an individual’s professional 
identity thus unfolding a theoretical connection between the literatures of knowledge 
and identity.  Its central argument concurs with Szulanski’s notion of ‘internal 
stickiness’ as a barrier to knowledge transfer but extends this hypothesis into the 
psychological ownership of knowledge and to the idea of ‘possessiveness’. The paper 
argues that the value of self-categorised knowledge places the latter within the 
individual’s cognitive structure of their identity.  It offers up the idea of valued 
knowledge to the knowledge transfer domain and suggests that feelings of 
possessiveness towards knowledge may intervene in the willingness of an individual 
to disclose knowledge in a knowledge transfer process.   
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Introduction 
Our review maps a route through the domains of knowledge and identity with the 
purpose of contributing an explanation of the phenomenon, often referred to as 
‘stickiness’, in which the flow of knowledge in an exchange process is inhibited.  It 
focuses on the individual psychological perspective of knowledge and its innate 
relationship to identity, that is, how the meaning of knowledge relates to the 
interpretation of the cognitive sense of self.  Such meanings, when activated, may 
offer a profound explanatory power to behaviours in the process of knowledge 
transfer.  We pick up on Szulanski’s (1996) notion of ‘internal stickiness’ because of 
his concern for barriers to knowledge transfer.  We note that whilst he emphasises 
ambiguity and comprehension as communication uncertainties, he attributes little 
influence to personal motivation. Following the line taken by Lam (2000), we 
acknowledge different types of knowledge and the fact that they can be held 
individually and collectively.  We concur with Szulanski that the process of 
knowledge transfer is not automatic and argue that an explanation may lie in issues 
surrounding knowledge ownership. Our focus is in short on expert professional 
knowledge in the context of knowledge transfer.  
The journey is complicated but the pathway is clear.  Literature in areas that 
cohere around the themes of the individual within knowledge transfer processes and 
the role that knowledge plays in relation to identity is reviewed.  What emerges from 
this is that identity affects willingness to transfer knowledge because the individual 
has psychological ownership.  This may induce feelings of possessiveness towards 
knowledge which, we argue is part of their professional identity; the resultant 
 4 
reluctance is, we argue, a source of stickiness.  In support of this, some arguments are 
fundamental.  
The first of these, concerns knowledge ownership.  Here we trace the theme of 
the locus of knowledge through the literature of individual-group psychology to 
uncover how the pluralism of ownership, i.e., that knowledge which can be owned by 
an individual and by their professional group, is related to the social identity 
affiliation process (Tajfel 1978).  In other words, an individual’s feelings about 
ownership of their knowledge are bound-up with affiliation to their professional 
group. We infer from this that the individual-group relationship influences the 
salience of knowledge to identity.  This influence, we suggest, occurs when the 
valuation of knowledge arbitrates the position of the individual on both polar 
dichotomies.  
We see the individual expert as attached to their knowledge through the 
valuation of that knowledge and similarly attached to their group when that evaluation 
becomes a favoured attribute of the individual’s group affiliation (professional 
association).  There are two cases to be argued.  Firstly, if knowledge is placed in a 
positively valued category within the cognitive structure then it may well be a 
favoured attribute of group attachment and therefore it is influential to the 
development of self identity. Secondly, the corpus of knowledge learned through 
professional training will be placed in a set of categories that may be similar (not 
identical) between professionals in the field.  This creates the possibility of a shared 
cognitive structure for individual professionals.  
The second fundamental argument concerning knowledge ownership is the 
complication that knowledge can be embedded in practice.   The fact that knowledge 
can be embedded in practice has the effect of emphasising the primacy of the 
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individual as the owner of the knowledge and simultaneously highlighting the role of 
competence in professional identity.  In this pathway between knowledge and identity 
the personal need of the professional for integration in the workplace creates a 
situation whereby the expert needs to demonstrate professional competence to fulfil 
the expectations of their colleagues and of the image of the professional body.  For 
example we trust an accountant because we trust the accounting profession. 
This paper explores the conceptual overlap and theoretical connections 
between the literature of identity and that of knowledge.  We see these as centred 
upon the question of the locus of ownership and on the issue of knowledge being 
embedded in action or practice at an individual level.  The view is offered that there is 
a reciprocal relationship between knowledge and identity in which both the individual 
psychological perspective and the social identity of the individual matters.  From 
social identity theory (Tajfel 1978) we assume that the professional gains their 
recognised professional identity from their professional group.  Therefore, in 
summary, we argue that, knowledge has a central place in the cognitive structure of 
an individual’s professional identity.  Thus located, this knowledge, we argue, is 
anchored by a degree of possessiveness which, in turn, affects the individual’s 
willingness to disclose their knowledge in a knowledge transfer process.  
In pursuit of our primary purpose of placing knowledge within the cognitive 
structure of identity we have identified a commonality within the literatures of 
knowledge and identity.  This consists of the conjoining of the individual aspect of 
knowledge with the self aspect of identity, the ownership aspect of knowledge with 
the group affiliation and the practical aspect of knowledge with the socialisation 
aspect of identity. We use psychological ownership of knowledge to extend the 
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connections between the literature of knowledge and identity and to explain the 
willingness behaviour in knowledge transfer process. 
This literature review begins with the context of knowledge transfer.  This is 
followed by a sub-section, entitled ‘knowledge’ which is intended as a platform for 
the principal exploration of how knowledge relates to identity, sub-section ‘identity 
and knowledge’.  The components of this platform are individualism, possessiveness 
and willingness and it is from this discussion that the main arguments are developed.  
 
Knowledge Transfer: the Context  
This section begins with a brief statement on the importance of knowledge transfer to 
economic development then we examine the different processes of knowledge transfer 
by reviewing the contribution of the principal models. 
 
The role of knowledge transfer within development and firm performance  
That knowledge transfer is a key factor in organisation performance is well 
established in the literature to the extent that it has become an institutionalised 
concept within economic and technological development (e.g. Drucker 1994; 
Dayasindhu 2002; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Osterloh and Frey 2000).  It is now 
accepted as part of industry and academic relations (Tallman, Jenkins, Henry and 
Pinch 2004).  The literature on economic development and strategy is clear in 
positioning technological clusters and knowledge transfer at the heart of the 
development process (Nonaka 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Tallman et al. 
2004).   
The central ideas which link knowledge transfer to development and 
performance are competitive advantage and strategic alliances. Work on 
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organisational outcomes emphasises the effect of alliances on increasing the firm’s 
stock of knowledge (Albert, Ashforth and Dutton 2000; Argote and Ingram 2000; 
Helfat 2000; Kogut and Zander 1996).  It is the social processes of networking and 
nexus-forming that bring about opportunities to gain knowledge (Argote, Ingram, 
Levine and Moreland 2000; Ibarra, Kilduff and Tsai 2005).  In this respect, attention 
has been paid to structural aspects such as proximity and clusters (Mansfield 1991; 
Mansfield 1995; Mansfield and Lee 1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). However, 
notwithstanding structural concerns there is an assumption in the alliance-forming 
process that, putting legal and competitive constraints aside, there is a level of 
openness to disclosure based on mutual interests (Ashforth 1985; Schneider 1990; 
West, Smith, Lu and Lawthom 1998).  However, the simple assumption that mutual 
interests guarantees collaboration is an unsafe one.  
Both the nature of the knowledge to be transferred and the level of 
organisational interaction is crucial (Steensma 1996; Mohrman, Gibson and Mohrman 
2002).   Central to this idea is the development of new relationships and structures.  
Cavusgil, Calantone and Zhao, 2003, for example, present a set of hypotheses 
concerning the relationships between inter-firm relationship strength and knowledge 
transfer which stresses that close relationships enhance the opportunities for people in 
firms.  Davenport and Prusak (1998) reported eight critical success factors for 
knowledge transfer including effective knowledge measurement, technical 
architecture, flexible organisational structure, knowledge-friendly culture, clear 
vision, a performance-based reward system, multi-channel knowledge transfer and 
senior management support.  These external benefits of knowledge transfer require 
some control of internal processes that transfer and transform knowledge. We note 
 8 
that these critical factors are all external to the individual, a position which we 
challenge. 
 
The processes of knowledge transfer:  mechanistic or individual? 
The principal literature we address in this section is summarised in Table 1 together 
with their model emphasis and contribution listed.  These models consider the 
processes of how knowledge is transferred, either mechanistically or individually 
oriented, focusing on the solution to the process.   
In reviewing the principal models we acknowledge that they are variations on 
the theme of socialisation within a group. However we highlight two themes which 
express the different objectives and solutions of the model. The first theme places 
emphasis on the ‘mechanistic’ aspect of the process of knowledge transfer 
highlighting structural and variable exogenous to the individual. The second theme 
goes some way towards incorporating human aspects into the process of knowledge 
transfer.  The review concludes that there is an emphasis on mechanistic solutions to 
knowledge transfer process and little emphasis on the individual’s role within this 
process.  The implication of this emphasis is the problematic view that knowledge 
transfer is seen as an automatic process.  The following discussion analyses and 
explains the main contributions identified in Table 1.   
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Table 1. A summary of process of knowledge transfer models 
 
Authors Model Emphasis on Identified 
Akbar (2003) Intra-individual knowledge 
transformation 
The higher the knowledge level, the 
greater is the degree of tacitness 
The critical element 
within tacit knowledge 
which generates 
creativity and 
innovation 
Andrews and 
Delahaye 
(2000) 
The psychosocial filter Organisational sharing, three clusters of 
psychosocial filters are: 
• Social confidence 
• Perceived credibility 
• Perceived trustworthiness 
The term Psychosocial 
filter to describe the 
factors which appeared 
to affect knowledge 
importing and 
knowledge sharing 
decisions 
Ashforth 
(2001) 
Entry Shock to socialisation 
process 
Four of the critical motives: 
• To locate and learn one’s role 
within the organisational context 
(identity) 
• To make sense of the situation and 
discern a purpose for being there 
• To recover a sense of self-
determination (control) 
• To connect with others, particularly 
one’s peers (belonging) 
 
Four of the critical 
motives that stimulates 
the socialisation 
process 
Boland, et al. 
(2001) 
Schema Schema as the mechanism by which 
experience of a particular kind of 
knowledge representation affects 
performance 
Schema can influence 
creative thinking of the 
knowledge transfer 
process 
Grant and 
Baden-
Fuller(2000) 
Three Conditions of 
Knowledge Transfer 
• Transmitter’s knowledge must be 
capable of being expressed in a 
communicable form 
• Must be understandable to the 
source and the recipient 
• Must be capable of aggregation 
 
The capability of 
knowledge transfer 
Lam (2000) Social embeddedness The dynamic relationship between 
individual and collective learning   
The importance of four types of 
knowledge: 
• Embrained knowledge 
(individual-explicit) 
• Embodied knowledge 
(individual-tacit) 
• Encoded knowledge 
(collective-explicit) 
• Embedded knowledge 
(collective- tacit) 
The dynamic 
relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malhotra 
(2003) 
 The importance of knowledge of 
personal connections and relationships; 
Individual held 
knowledge and 
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individual held knowledge can be 
effectively used in combination with the 
experience of working together as a 
team 
personal connections 
Authors Model Emphasis on Identified 
Nonaka, et al. 
(2001); 
Nonaka 
(1991); 
Nonaka,  
(1994); 
Nonaka and 
Tacheuchi 
(1995) 
 
 
The SECI Process 
(Socialisation, 
Externalisation, 
Internalisation   and 
Combination) 
A continuous and dynamic interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge 
Knowledge transfer as 
a highly social process 
O’Dell and 
Grayson 
(1998) 
Steps in the Knowledge 
Transfer Process 
Creating, identifying, collecting, and 
organising the best practices and 
internal knowledge 
 
Difficulties in early 
stages of knowledge 
transfer 
O’Dell and 
Grayson 
(1998) 
Best practice transfer Culture, technology, infrastructure and 
measurement are the significant enabler 
in the process of knowledge transfer. 
 
The enabler in the 
process of knowledge 
transfer 
Szulanski 
(1996) 
Key barriers of knowledge 
transfer 
• Ignorance 
• Absorptive capacity 
• Lack of pre-existing relationship 
• Lack of motivation 
 
The barrier of 
knowledge transfer had 
to do with casual 
ambiguity (=vagueness, 
doubt) 
Szulanski  
(2000) 
The basic elements of a 
transfer 
• Source 
• Channel 
• Message 
• Recipient 
• Context 
 
The basic elements of a 
transfer 
Szulanski 
(2000) 
Four-phase process • Initiation stickiness 
• Implementation stickiness 
• Ramp-up stickiness 
• Integration stickiness 
Four types of stickiness 
of knowledge 
Nonaka and 
Yamanouchi  
(1989) 
 Metaphor leads to effective transfer Effectiveness in 
capturing and 
conveying image 
amounts of data 
information and ideas. 
Von Krogh, et 
al.  (2000) 
Four types of interaction • Originating (sharing tacit 
knowledge between individuals) 
• Conversing (having group 
conversations to form concepts) 
• Documenting (converting 
knowledge into explicit forms) 
       Internalising (making explicit      
       knowledge tacit once more) 
The natural interactions 
among different levels 
will expand the entire 
knowledge creation 
process 
 
 
 
Weick (1995) Seven properties of 
sensemaking 
The beliefs of individuals and their 
social units mutually influence each 
other 
Seven properties of 
Sensemaking 
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The first theme concerns the structural determinants of socialisation processes 
that encourage knowledge transfer (Nonaka 1991; Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and 
Tacheuchi 1995; Lam 2000; Nonaka et al. 2001).  The model of Socialisation, 
Externalisation, Combination, and Internalisation (SECI) (Nonaka and Takeuchi 
1995) is concerned with transforming knowledge through interaction and by practice 
within the organisation and emphasises learning and continuous innovation.  Here the 
focus is on culture, communication and interaction within groups and how this 
encourages knowledge exchange, sharing and consequently development and 
learning. 
 The same structural and interactional approach inhabits best practice models.  
O’Dell and Grayson (1998) offer a best practice of knowledge transfer model 
including a specific set of enabler and steps which are closely related to organisational 
structure. Lam (2000) and Von Krogh et al. (2000) show a dynamic social 
relationship between and within groups and suggests the importance of social 
embeddedness.  However, the issue of the form in which knowledge is communicable 
is part of the structural argument.  For knowledge to be shared or exchanged it has to 
be in a form that is understandable to all parties (Nonaka and Yamanouchi 1989; 
Grant and Baden-Fuller 2000; Malhotra 2003).  Andrews and Delahaye (2000) 
introduce psychology into the process with their idea of a ‘psychosocial filter’.  
However, this filter is related to socialisation and the communication process.  
The second theme moves towards human factors which determine  
effectiveness in the knowledge transfer process (Szulanski 1996, 2000; Ashforth 
2001; Akbar 2003).   The work of Szulanski (1996, 2000) examines communication 
and includes variables such as source, channel, message, recipient and context.  The 
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latter focuses on the analysis of key barriers to knowledge transfer and identified four 
types of stickiness of knowledge. These are to an extent passive and unintended 
barriers. The emphasis here is on the limits of communication and motivation.  He 
coins the term ‘internal stickiness’, meaning to become fearful of losing ownership 
and thus become unwilling to support the transfer, and with connotations of 
reluctance by the recipient to envisage change.  Ashforth (2001) identifies the critical 
motives in knowledge transfer processes including the elements of identity, sense 
making, self control and sense of belonging, concluding such motives stimulate the 
socialisation process.  The work of Akbar (2003) shows the higher the knowledge 
level, the greater is the degree of tacitness between individuals which puts emphasis 
on the learning aspects of socialisation.  The implication here is that cooperation 
between experts is based on assumptions about the extent of mutual knowledge. 
What the above analysis shows is that the current literature sees knowledge 
transfer as a socialisation phenomenon and seeks explanations through the structural 
determinants of communication and motivation.  From this analysis we identify the 
problem that the individual as a psychological entity has been overlooked in the 
process.  Our intention is to extend Szulanski’s idea that reluctance exists within the 
process and that requires explanation.  In order to do this we have adopted an intra-
individual perspective.  In other words, we bring the individual as a psychological 
entity into the knowledge transfer process and argue that knowledge and identity 
intervene in this process. 
 
Knowledge  
From the review of the knowledge transfer literature we argue that the individual 
perspective has been neglected, therefore it is from this perspective that we now 
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examine aspects of knowledge.  The central argument concerns how knowledge is 
psychologically owned by the individual.  In this respect we evoke the notion of 
possession and go on to argue that this property can have an effect on willingness to 
disclose their knowledge.  To this end this section explores three themes related to 
knowledge.  The first is concerned with the internalisation of knowledge.  The second 
theme explores the notion of possessiveness, and the third theme deals with the effect 
of internalisation and possessiveness on willingness to disclose. The purpose of 
exploring these themes from the individual perspective is that internalisation and 
possessiveness will later be shown to connect knowledge to identity, whilst 
willingness to disclose will be shown to be an intervening factor in knowledge 
transfer. 
In asserting the primacy of the individual in the knowledge transfer process it 
is necessary to clarify what we mean by the individual perspective. Here we make two 
distinctions. The first is between our focus on the intra-individual perspective and, 
what the ‘knowledge governance’ movement refers to as the ‘micro level’ (Foss 2007; 
Rothaermal and Hess 2007).  The second is a concern to distinguish related concepts 
of knowledge learned and validated by experience and socially constructed 
knowledge because the distinction may influence the locus of knowledge. As our 
basic proposition is concerned to place knowledge within a cognitive structure we see 
knowledge as an intrinsic component of the individual. This contrasts with the 
knowledge governance movement which gets close to the individual, in as far as 
seeing individuals as being part of micro-processes which can be governed and 
incentivised, but which remains, in its present state of evolution, as an exogenous 
approach. Knowledge governance is not yet directly concerned with the psychology 
of the individual; it is concerned with motivation not motives. Our approach goes 
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further, to explain the psychology of the individual by uncovering a reluctance within 
the knowledge transfer process.  
 
Knowledge and individualism 
The perspective of the individual as the prime locus of knowledge is contested terrain.  
Cook and Brown (1999), for example, argue that the individual locus of knowledge 
has been too influential and is dangerous to an integrated approach, an argument that 
is reversed by Van de Ven and Johnson (2006) and supported by Felin and Hesterly 
(2007).  In asserting the primacy of the individual we are not denying the social 
constructivist argument that knowledge is a social phenomenon that is different from 
the aggregation of individuals (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, 246).  Nor do we dispute 
the collectivist view that knowledge can be held within a group (Halbwach 1992).  
Indeed we will show that this dichotomy is central to arguments concerning the 
meaning of professional knowledge.   
Our stance that the individual perspective is important to the understanding of 
knowledge transfer is based on three premises.  The first of these is that knowledge 
embedded in action and beliefs reciprocate each other. The term practice implies both 
action and belief.  This means that learning through doing is applying prior 
knowledge or beliefs.  Following the line of Dewey (1986) that knowledge is context 
specific, practical knowledge can be seen both as the ‘understanding’ that emerges 
from direct engagement with the environment and from the applied prior knowledge 
based on theoretical and scientific knowledge (Kondrat 1992). Philosophical 
pragmatism sees knowledge as having an instrumental value which places it at the 
centre of the ‘truth process’ and simultaneously connects it to action.  In this 
philosophical approach prior beliefs become ‘true’ when confronted by events and 
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reality.  Here confronting information in the external environment means completing 
some action in a specific context.  It is by doing this that the individual validates their 
existing beliefs and, as information is transformed into knowledge, simultaneously 
gains explanations that might constitute new knowledge (Morton 2003).  It is this 
reinforcing nature of action and belief which validates knowledge through its own 
instrumental effectiveness and grants primacy to the atomised individual as the agent 
of knowledge (Tourinho and Neno 2003).   
It also draws the external locus of knowledge into the individual’s world 
through the process of engaging with the environment.  In other words, knowing is 
having experienced the transformation of information into knowledge (Polanyi 1964, 
1975; Machlup and Mansfield 1983; Kolb 1984; Newell et al. 2002; Orlikowski 
2002).  This dual nature of knowledge as something both internal and external is 
captured and operationalised by Simon’s concept of bounded rationality where inner 
psychology meets the outer environment (Simon 1999).  The notion of internalised 
knowledge derived from external enactment enables individuals not just to act 
effectively but to imagine possible actions (Maturana and Varela 1987; Von Krogh 
and Roos 1995).  
 We suggest that the notions of practice and effectiveness brings forms of 
knowledge together and enhances awareness and appreciation of the value of existing 
knowledge and we see this as a tentative connection with the idea of professional 
competence.  In other words, valuing knowledge is part of a process which binds 
professional practice with professional identity.  
The second premise concerning knowledge and individualism is the argument 
that knowledge can be intrinsic to a person.  Bernstein (2000) argues that knowing is 
personal, but only when it is internalised. Therefore we suggest that knowing places 
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knowledge not just within the individual self, but also within the realm of that 
individual’s self-identity.  This raises the question of how and why this should be the 
case.  Bernstein puts forward an alternative idea which challenges the statement that 
knowledge is personal and owned.  He states that knowledge is money and should 
flow like money to wherever it can create advantage and profit, for knowledge is 
separated from persons, their commitments and their personal dedications.  These 
become impediments and restrictions on the flow of knowledge.  Moving knowledge 
about should not be more difficult than moving and regulating money.  In other 
words, he is arguing that any possessiveness associated with the inner value of 
knowledge is an impediment to its greater purpose.  This orientation represents a 
fundamental break in the relation between the knower and what is known.  However, 
it does not separate knowledge from the individual.  For Bernstein, knowledge was an 
outer expression of an inner relationship.  The inner relationship was a guarantee of 
the legitimacy, integrity, worthiness and value of the knowledge.  Intrinsically valuing 
knowledge can itself produce tensions within the individual in terms of application 
and continuous renewal.  Innate knowledge produces outward behaviour.  This view 
offers a ‘rope-bridge’ between the cognitive structure, in which knowledge is formed 
into categories, and the behaviour that follows from that categorisation.  It may offer a 
profound explanatory power in understanding firstly, what the cognitive knowledge 
held by professionals in terms of categorising themselves professionally is, and 
secondly what the behavioural effects placed upon them are. 
The final premise takes us back to the division of labour and the 
interdependence of technological processes. In simple terms, the fact of working with 
others carries the assumption of a degree of commonality of knowledge.  Common 
knowledge, however, is not a prerequisite of cooperation within a group. This is the 
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terrain of the knowledge management literature which sees the flow of knowledge as 
essential to effectiveness within organisations (Karreman and Alvesson 2004).  
However, the previously quoted evidence that knowledge can be a ‘sticky’ asset, 
meaning that it flows between locations with some difficulty is problematic 
(Szulanski 1996; Von Hippel 1994).  The conclusion that there must be impediments 
is unavoidable. To an extent, this problem can be seen either as one of codification, 
the impediment being the variety of taxonomies generated (Tsoukas 1996 in 
Orlikowski 2002), or, as one of structural support design (Kelloway and Barling 
2000).  However, these may not be the sole sources of the problem.  
While common knowledge may not be a perquisite of cooperation, knowledge 
which specifically enables people to function interdependently is. It gives this 
particular form of knowledge a value both to the individual and the organisation.   The 
value placed on this knowledge may well be related to both cooperation and the 
formation of a situated social identity.  In other words, knowledge may remain 
individual but have the function of engaging with others and it is valued for that 
reason.   
 
Knowledge and the notion of possessiveness 
In the arguments which follow it is possible to suggest that the psychological 
ownership of knowledge can be strong enough to amount to possession (Pierce, 
Kostova and Dirks 2001).  We argue that, if we are correct, possessions and 
possessiveness are part of the process of identity formation. 
Furby (1991) offered the thesis that there is a ‘psychology of mine’ which 
conceptualises ownership as entailing an association between a person and an object.  
This association leads to the valuation of a possession playing a dominant role in the 
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owner’s identity to the extent that they become part of the extended self (Belk 1988; 
Dittmar 1992).  Mann (1991, 211) wrote, “What I own feels like a part of me” 
whereas Sartre (1969, 591-592) noted that “to have is one of the three categories of 
human existence” and that “the totality of my possessions reflects the totality of my 
being …I am what I have… what is mine is myself”.  And yet possessions are secured 
in a special place labelled ‘mine’ (Kline and France 1899).  Rudmin (1993, 55) wrote: 
“‘Mine’ is a small word.  It is deceptive in its power and importance.  It controls our 
behaviour, but we rarely notice”.  These arguments indicate that possessiveness is an 
intrinsic process that partially determines one’s self identity.  This intrinsic value of 
possessions grants to the individual both a sense of continuity across time and security 
e.g. like a much loved old jacket (Steiner 1978; Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003).  The 
meaning of possessions however, is not just an intrinsic attachment.  They are visible 
and communicable and can be ascribed a meaning by society (Kron 1983; McCracken 
1986; Saunders 1990; Dittmar 1992).  They communicate the individual’s identity to 
others, thus achieving recognition and social prestige, and are therefore symbols of 
self (Cooper 1976).  
Two aspects of possession have an important effect on their relationship to 
identity.  Firstly, they represent an aspect of self-control and secondly, they are, by 
their very nature, favoured.  Furby (1978) argues that individuals feel more control 
over their possessions than other aspects of life.  Possession may be one manifestation 
of ‘effectance motivation’, in that the possessor has the ability to affect and control 
the object in whatever way they wish.  Formanek (1991) takes a different line.  He 
argues that the accumulation of possessions produces a positive and uplifting effect. 
The more you have of something you like, the better you feel.  Possibly as a result of 
this self-enhancing bias, owned objects appear to be more attractive and rated more 
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favourably than objects that are not owned (Nuttin 1987; Beggan 1992).  It is this 
aspect of favouritism towards the possession that we argue is salient to identity 
because it is reflected in a concept which is central to social identity formation, i.e. 
attachment or sense of belonging.  And it is this relationship that connects knowledge 
to identity. 
Notwithstanding the above arguments on possessions and identity, the most 
important issue is whether knowledge can be regarded as a psychological possession. 
Our arguments here are tentative owing to lack of empirical support but we give 
weight to the argument of Bernstein (2000) that knowledge can be internalised.  Our 
assumption is therefore that to be internalised the knowledge has, in some way, to be 
valued and, that if valued, it can be regarded as a psychological possession which 
forms an inner meaning to one self.  One possible value that can be placed on 
knowledge is that of utility, that it is valued for its usefulness.  The concept of 
usefulness grants to knowledge an instrumental purpose; something has to be 
achieved.  The achievement can be an action, a thought or both but, in either case, the 
knowledge has a value.  It can be a practical goal, or exploration of something 
theoretical, or even an abstract concept (Scribner 1986).  Usefulness as a value relates 
to a possession’s role in providing necessary functions (Prentice 1987; Dittmar 1992).  
It could be argued, for example, that some forms of knowledge are valued for their 
symbolic status which may have the function of distinguishing ‘insiders from 
outsiders’.  Similarly, knowledge can be a reminder to an individual of their group 
affiliation (Collins 2004).  The principle we evoke here is that to understand if and 
how knowledge is possessed we must understand if and how it is valued.  This will 
show how it is being used and provide a connection between knowledge and identity.  
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Returning to the ‘stickiness’ proposition; we argue that psychologically 
possessed knowledge can be a barrier to knowledge transfer.  Dirks, Cummings and 
Pierce (1996) indicated that psychological ownership explains the conditions under 
which, individuals both promote and resist change but they did not extend the 
argument as far as establishing a barrier.  We argue that, when professionals, hold 
their expert knowledge as a self-categorised possession it becomes part of their 
professional identity.  Such ‘possession’ may evoke possessiveness behaviour which 
will, in turn, intervene in the level of willingness to disclose and transfer their 
knowledge.  
 
Knowledge and willingness  
The literature on willingness is limited and has a problem with its definition because it 
is often taken for granted.  In its simplest form willingness can be conceived as a 
freedom from reluctance (Kahn 1990; May, Gilson and Harter 2004).  However, it is 
not uncommon for the concept simply to be subsumed within the attitude/behaviour 
prediction relationship as intentionality (see for example Aryee, Chay and Chew 
1996; Gallucci and Perugini 2003; Landau, Shamir and Arthur 1992; Lee 2001; 
Morgan, Miller and Arasaratnam 2003; Stilwell, Liden, Parsons and Deconinck 
1998).  Putting aside the limitations of definitions, we argue that there are two aspects 
to the willingness relationship to knowledge.  Firstly, there is the willingness to be 
part of the knowledge transfer process and secondly, the actual willingness to disclose 
and exchange knowledge.  Willingness to participate does not guarantee the latter.  
Both aspects of willingness are influenced by the level of social identification with 
collective action and by reciprocity. 
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Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) argue that a willingness to participate in 
collective action might be better understood as an aspect of identification with 
particular groups.  The willingness of individuals to engage in collective action by a 
group is seen as a measure of their identification with that group (Fosh 1993; Kelly 
and Kelly 1994). This approach makes group functioning dependent on trust.  Whilst 
this is important, the issue of reciprocity is more immediate to the knowledge transfer 
process.  Molm (1994) suggests that a structure of reciprocal dependence is a defining 
characteristic of all social relations based on exchange.  Fehr, Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2002) provide compelling evidence which indicates that many people can 
have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate if treated fairly.  They call this behavioural 
propensity ‘strong reciprocity’.  Empirically it can lead to an almost universal 
cooperation in circumstances in which pure cooperation is found, i.e. in circumstances 
in which there is only completely self-interested behaviour, which might otherwise 
cause a complete breakdown of co-operation.  This view is supported by Goh (2002), 
who argues that cooperation and collaboration are the dimensions which are critical to 
knowledge transfer. For example, knowledge transfer requires the willingness of the 
individual to work with others and disclose knowledge to their mutual benefit.  This 
implies that knowledge transfer will not occur in an organisation unless employees 
and groups have a natural tendency to share and collaborate with each other.  This 
natural tendency is termed as ‘propensity to reciprocity’ it intervenes between identity 
and actual behaviour (Gallucci and Perugini 2003).  In summary, both the 
dependence-on-trust case and the promise of reciprocal action case are part of the 
individual-group dichotomy.  Whilst this argument locates the influences on 
willingness in the individual-group context and suggests reciprocity as a process, it is 
not complete. There is a clear need for empirical research on the determinants of 
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willingness to disclose once the individual is willing to participate.  The knowledge 
transfer literature infers that once people are willingly inside the process that they will 
exchange knowledge; we contest this assumption. 
 
Identity and Knowledge 
In this section we show a number of cognitive and the sociological routes that relate 
knowledge to identity.  We build these relationships into a conceptual framework in 
order to illustrate how they intervene in the process of knowledge transfer. In the 
previous discussion we have put forward three ideas which, we argue, form a basis for 
relating knowledge to identity.  The ideas are individualism, the notion of knowledge 
being possessed and the possibility that possessiveness can intervene in willingness.  
We suggest it is the individual internalised role of knowledge and identity which 
intervene the process of knowledge transfer. We argue that knowledge has a place in 
the individual’s cognitive identity structure and consequently a role in identity 
formation.  From this we go on to show that the maintenance and enhancement of 
knowledge is a social process involving group attachment procured through identity 
formation processes.  These assertions are based on four premises.  
• Premise 1: That knowledge is part of the self-categorisation process; the way 
an individual locates themselves within their cognitive social world is 
influenced by the self-valuation of their knowledge.  
• Premise 2: That knowledge is held and categorised as a social construct 
through group affiliation.  
• Premise 3: That knowledge is embedded within action; applied knowledge 
may even be unconscious because it is contained within action. It can however 
be demonstrated as competence. 
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• Premise 4: Bringing together the second and third premise; there is a process 
in which awareness of identity is activated when confronted with knowledge 
embedded in a situation.  
In brief, the analysis of these premises needs both a social psychological and a 
sociological perspective.  From a social psychological perspective the theoretical 
foundation of identity formation and function lies in identity theory (Burke 1980; 
Burke and Reitzes 1981; Burke and Tully 1977; Stryker 1980; Stryker 1987) with its 
connotations of self-categorisation theory (Turner 1982; Turner 1985; Turner 1987; 
Oakes 1987; Oakes, Haslam and Turner 1994; Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty 
1994; see also Onorato and Turner 2001) and social identity theory (Tajfel 1978) with 
its concept of group affiliations.  It is this latter theory which provides the theoretical 
context for relating knowledge to the individual – group relationship.  The 
sociological perspective in contrast gives insight into the formation of identities by its 
emphasis on the continuous dialogue between self identity and present situation.   
 
Self-identity and self-concept distinguished 
Identity is essentially about self-definition, how one defines oneself and hopes to be 
defined by others (Gecas 1982).  Although it is a representation of the self it needs to 
be differentiated from the idea of the self-concept which is focussed more on how 
people seen themselves in terms of personality characteristics.  The self-concept is a 
configuration of perception of the individual’s personality and fundamental view of 
the world; a mental representation of personality (Rogers 1951; Sternberg and Ruzgis 
1994).  The self-concept is developed in childhood and, after the formative years of 
life, becomes fairly set and is made less malleable by circumstance.  Identity, in 
contrast, is a self description that allows the individual to place themselves within the 
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various worlds they inhabit.  The implication of this is that identity can change and 
that an individual can hold a number of identities simultaneously.  However, for an 
identity to have any meaning (be self-recognised) it has, to an extent, to be stable.  
Markus and Kunda (1986) make the important point that self identity is both stable 
and malleable.  The stabilising element of this process is the anchoring effect of the 
categorisation of knowledge.  
 
 
Self-categorisation and knowledge  
When we argue that knowledge is central to identity we are saying that it has a 
conscious presence in the cognitive structures of the self and of self identity in 
particular.  This leads directly to questions about where knowledge is placed, and by 
what process.  We argue that the process by which the individual places and locates 
themselves is one of self-categorisation – sorting life into mental categories.  Being an 
individual is itself a category (Turner 1985; Turner 1987; Turner et al. 1987; Crisp 
and Hewstone 2006).  From this standpoint individuals have levels of abstraction in 
their cognitive structures which vary in strength and produce relative judgements 
about themselves.  The substance of these categories can be internal aspects of the self 
such as substantive knowledge (for example, ‘I’m good at chemistry’) and self 
knowledge (e.g. ‘I’m a slow learner’) but it can also be the location of the self within 
the individual’s social environment (e.g. ‘I’m middle class’).  We argue that the 
individual’s self-valuation of their substantive knowledge would be a dimension 
which they use to place themselves with their cognitive world in terms of their group 
affiliations and feelings of self-efficacy (Lang and Lee 2005).  In other words, the 
process uses substantive matter, including own knowledge, to guide the self into a set 
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of categories (Turner 1982).  Such self-categorisation guides individual behaviour 
including the direction of group affiliations.  Haslam (2004), for example, suggests 
that self-categorisation as personal categorisation would affect commitment to group 
participation (e.g. commitment to a knowledge transfer process).  This highlights the 
crucial form of self-categorisation that links it directly to identity, that is, group 
attachment or affiliation.  
 
Here is the essential dichotomy of identity; that it can be both personal 
(individualistic categories) and social (group orientated categories).  The resolution of 
this dichotomy, we argue, is part of the identity formation process and more 
specifically such resolution will be influenced by the way in which the individual is 
attached to their chosen group.  
 
Individual-group affiliation and attribute valuation 
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1978) argues that people seek part of their self identity 
through affiliation to groups which they then favour.  In the context of professional 
identity the group is deemed to be the professional body.  The key to understanding 
how the fact of dual ownership of knowledge creates routes towards identity lie in 
attribute favouritism and shared categorisation.  There are four distinct routes, or lines 
of argument, that relate knowledge to individual-group affiliation and here social 
psychology and sociology offer different contributions.  Firstly, in the case of 
professional knowledge, the fact that it can be held both by the individual and by the 
professional group means that the process of social identity is salient.  Secondly, the 
ethnocentric property of social identity theory suggests the terms of group attachment 
may feature knowledge as a valued and favoured group attribute.  Thirdly, the 
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argument that knowledge is a social construct normally sits within an organisational 
context but we extend such arguments to include professional bodies.  The key 
element here is that a corpus of knowledge cannot be remembered by the individual as 
such but can be remembered collectively.  Fourthly, we accept the contribution of the 
socialisation process in attaching an individual to a group in an organisational context. 
 
Following the line of Tajfel (1969, 1978) that cognitive categories are pre-
evaluated entities, it follows that the way an individual categorises their knowledge 
resolves into an evaluated set of categories.  In the case of expert knowledge we 
assume that it is highly valued knowledge.  There are two levels of abstraction here.  
In one case knowledge itself is a category.  If that category is valued then it may well 
be a favoured attribute of group attachment and therefore it is influential to the 
development of self identity.  In this scenario identity is constructed using knowledge 
as a valued attribute of a group to which the individual favours.  In the second case 
the corpus of knowledge learned through professional training will be placed in a set 
of categories that may be similar (not identical) between professionals in the field.  In 
other words, individuals may categorise their knowledge as a salient attribute of their 
group attachment which creates the possibility of the group having common elements 
within their cognitive structure of identity as well as a sense of own group favouritism 
(members could equally well favour other attributes such as prestige).  
 
Collective knowledge and action 
Bounded rationality suggests that knowledge cannot exist in its entirety within the 
individual’s consciousness (Simon 1999). Therefore the question arises as to how 
does a professional recall the corpus of knowledge they learned to qualify?  Halbwach 
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(1992) reinforces the arguments made by workplace socialisation processes 
transferring and transforming knowledge when he argues that it is only through 
affiliation to groups that an individual can recall knowledge because that knowledge 
is formed and applied in a specific group context.  It is in this sense that memory 
requires a group dimension.  Organisational cognition argues that tacit knowledge is 
contained within activity systems (work systems and routines) that represent a 
collective mind in that the system itself only works because of a shared 
interdependence of knowledge between group members (Spender 1998).  The 
awareness of such knowledge is, according to Weick and Roberts (1993) dependent 
on the concept of paying heed (mindfulness).  But this is disputed by Reber (1993) 
who points out that much tacit knowledge is unconscious and also is effective.  Here 
Reber is following Polanyi (1964) in that some knowledge is unconsciously known 
(e.g. how to ride a bike).  This notion of tacit knowledge depending on activity with 
others suggests that knowledge, once outside that system, may not be within the reach 
of recall.  It can only be recalled within a group context.  However, irrespective of the 
notion of interrelated activity, the case for action as a source of knowledge is crucial 
to the relationship between knowledge and identity.  We argue that professional 
actions contain professional knowledge.  Performance of an action embodies 
knowledge within it.  It is this notion that links the wider concept of professional 
conduct directly to identity.  
 
Socialisation and identity 
Sociological theories of identity formation point to the transitional and sometimes 
provisional nature of identity.  Individuals construct identity from the degree of fit 
between the current self-identity and the discourse presented by the present situation 
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(Schryer and Spoel 2005).  Broadly speaking theories focus on organisational and 
work task influences on one hand, and on social interaction on the other.  The 
processes of transition and change are influenced by organisational socialisation and 
the requirement of the work task (Downing 2005; Pratt, Rockmann and Kaufman 
2006).  The emphasis on the nature of the task draws the argument back towards the 
centrality of knowledge within identity and in the direction of the valuation of 
knowledge, particularly the utility value. In support of this is the notion that the role 
of the task is to validate competence.  This in turn re-enforces the current identity.  By 
performing a task we validate our knowledge (Wallace 1995).  
The social interaction arguments centre upon processes that arbitrate the 
individual self with the need for a social identity and also upon relational identities 
(Breakwell 1992).  Markus and Kunda (1986) suggest that the need to be seen as 
similar to others yet unique is an intrinsic dilemma, resolution of which influences the 
self-concept as well as self identity.  The idea that identity can be a function of 
placement in relation to individuals and to groups is pursued by Sluss and Ashworth 
(2007).  They argue that not only does that add to the multiplicity of possible 
identities, it also makes the important point that the individual’s ‘social world view’ 
can alter depending on relational identity. These are arguments in favour of the 
situation influencing identity but they do not contradict the notion of a more secure 
cognitive structure for identity. This set of processes can come together in a single 
process to make the individual aware of the relationship between their knowledge and 
their professional identity.  This single process, we suggest, is the activated identity. 
 
Knowledge and the activated identity 
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We argue that identity itself is an active psychological entity.  In this respect, we  
argue for the importance of the process whereby identities are activated by situations 
and suggest that such situations are interpreted through a set of prior assumptions 
which are, in part, engendered by group affiliations.  Therefore the content and 
structure of identity becomes engaged with the situation (Endsley 1988).  We argue 
that when this process occurs it is possessed knowledge and its place in identity that 
will come to the fore. 
A sense of professionalism occurs when specialised knowledge is critical to 
doing the work (Fine 1996).  Here the content dimensions of identity structure that are 
relevant to the situation are brought into play.   In this argument elements of the 
situation make the individual conscious of their own self-identity.  The situation 
‘speaks’ directly to the content of the individual’s identity.  Here there must be some 
form of recognition of relevance, salience or difference between the content 
dimensions of self-identity.  We argue that the individual’s categorised knowledge 
structure can be activated by the specifics of the situation.  For example, for a sports 
fan (where the sports fan’s identity is activated by seeing sport) watching soccer 
without knowledge of the rules would force comparisons with other games as a means 
of understanding, but would also, and  simultaneously, be verifying their 
identification with other games and their identity as a sports fan.  Although 
knowledge and group affiliation are involved in the interpretation of the situation in 
this simplistic example, the strength of these two processes, comparison and 
verification, would depend on the motivational context (wanting to watch sport).  
However simply being able to use knowledge to interpret a situation need not engage 
the identity: the verification process is not automatic.  The non-sports fans could be 
engaged through curiosity and try to develop new knowledge but there would be no 
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verification of identity unless the individual identified with a group who ‘dislike 
sport’.  The ‘fit’ process involves knowledge alignment and verification.  It also 
involves motivation but exactly what role motivation plays in the ‘fit’ process remains 
unclear.  What this example illustrates is that there are two complimentary processes 
working together. In seeking ‘fit’ the individual is determining which part of their 
knowledge structure will be applicable to the situation and simultaneously verifying 
that they have that knowledge.  Consequently, these processes feed back into the 
individual’s sense of professional identity. 
At one level there is the issue of the individual proactively wanting to impose 
on a situation in order to affect it and create a statement about self/identity (Serpe and 
Stryker 1987).  A more common situation would be are where a goal or purpose is 
contained in the situation requiring a judgement and by this means issues of 
intentions, choice and value are drawn into the activation process.  Here the relevance 
of the individual professional’s knowledge is the activating agent in the situation.  
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) argue that action is always a complex amalgam of 
social and interactive phenomenon.  The need to make a judgement brings in the 
processes associated with ‘fit’ with the situation.  The individual needs to feel a sense 
of security in the rightness of the judgement.  This sense of security comes on the one 
hand from the knowledge basis from which it was made reinforced by their 
professional identity and on the other hand from the inner meaning of the knowledge 
that has been valuated and categorised.  If, as Coleman (1990) argues, actions are 
caused by anticipated consequences then the only guide the professional has to 
estimating those consequences is their accumulated, valued professional knowledge.  
 
 
 31 
A conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework is built in two stages.  The first stage uses the theoretical 
arguments made above to explain how knowledge is related to group affiliation and 
thus to identity.  The second stage shows how the process by which willingness to 
transfer knowledge is affected by the individual’s professional identity and the place 
of knowledge within it.   
 
The first stage incorporates the forgoing arguments that connect knowledge to 
self identity through a set of six processes;  
1. self-categorisation by means of knowledge 
2. attachment to a group which co-owns the knowledge 
3. attachment to that group through knowledge as a valued group attribute 
4. the dependence on the group context for recall of knowledge 
5. recall of knowledge through professional actions sanctified by the 
group 
6. the need to be socialised into the current situation and to adjust identity 
to fit in with the professional work group. 
 The first five processes are cognitive and affective, with the latter being 
behavioural.  Figure 1 illustrates the processes by which knowledge is related to group 
affiliation.   
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There are two routes; the cognitive and affective route (left side of diagram) 
and the socialisation process (right side of diagram).   Both routes express different 
processes of group affiliation which conjoin in the concept of identity.  The lower box 
illustrates that the cognitive and the social come together under the banner of 
demonstrable competence when the group sanctioned knowledge is demonstrated to 
colleagues, and thus validating the individual’s professional status and legitimacy as a 
group member.   
The thrust of our arguments have been to explore theoretical connections 
between knowledge to identity.  The second stage of the conceptual framework, 
Cognitive Individual- group 
Affiliation processes
1. self categorisation by means
of knowledge
2. attachment to a group which 
co-owns the knowledge
3. attachment to that group
through knowledge as a 
valued group attribute
4. the dependence on the group
context for recall of knowledge
5. recall of knowledge through
professional actions sanctioned
by the group
Socialisation processes
6. the need to socialise into
the current situation and to fit in 
with the professional work group 
Demonstrated competence
5 is joined to 6 to re-enforce
Professional identity
Figure 1  Processes relating knowledge to identity through group affiliation
Identity
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illustrated in Figure 2 draws conclusions as to how knowledge and identity relations 
affect knowledge transfer.  Fundamentally our arguments seek to explain the 
existence of a personal reluctance to exchange knowledge based on individual 
psychological knowledge ownership and its relationship to group affiliation.  This, we 
argue, influences the willingness of the individual to exchange their knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Process from identity to willingness  
 
In Figure 2, we use the expression ‘high salience of knowledge’ to represent 
the valuation through internalisation of knowledge.  The key element of the 
conceptual framework is that it is the internalisation of knowledge, valued by 
Individual Professional 
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disclose their professional
knowledge
High salience of 
knowledge 
fit with situation
Identity activated
Individualism
Feelings of 
possessiveness
Willingness to 
disclose/
transfer knowledge
Professional group affiliation
Internalised knowledge
Intervene Intervene
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individuals for whatever reason, which counts.  These diagrams show progress from a 
request to disclose through to the possibility that possessiveness based on knowledge 
ownership may intervene.  The dotted line expresses the innate dichotomy of 
knowledge ownership between individual and group.  The internalisation is about the 
valuation of knowledge, irrespective of the locus of ownership.  
 
 
Conclusions  
Our starting point has been the ‘stickiness’ of knowledge evident in knowledge 
transfer processes.  We have argued a case for the proposition that knowledge has a 
central place in the cognitive structure of an individual’s professional identity.  Thus 
located, this knowledge, we argue, is anchored by a degree of possessiveness which, 
in turn, affects the individual’s willingness to disclose their knowledge in a knowledge 
transfer process. It is in our view that empirical support is needed for the central 
plank of this assertion, that is the self-evaluation of knowledge and its relationship to 
feeling of psychological ownership.  
 Notwithstanding these concerns we have made a case for the argument that 
knowledge can be psychologically possessed and have suggested that the valuation of 
knowledge is central to that idea.  We conclude from this that this phenomenon 
intervenes in the process of willingness to disclose knowledge, which in effect implies 
that it can promote both positive willingness and reluctance.   
This intervention means that the individual has to be conscious of their 
knowledge and here we draw attention to the nature of practice as having a role in 
identity.  In this respect not only does it embody professional knowledge but it also 
has the ability to activate the identity that makes it salient to the idea of professional 
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identity.  If when knowledge is activated it simultaneously makes the individual 
conscious of the locus of, and value of, that knowledge, then action is connected 
directly to the nature of identity.  Building on this, we suggest, in the context of 
professional knowledge, that the effectiveness of practice, taking action that works, is 
reinforcement at the individual level, not just of ability but of a body of professional 
knowledge. 
One of the foundation arguments in support of our conceptual framework is 
the notion of internalisation. The problem here is that the literature does not firmly 
connect internalisation of knowledge to identity.  The literature is limited as to what 
internalisation actually means and this aspect needs empirical support if stronger 
connections are to be made between knowledge and identity.  In fact any research 
agenda on internalisation should be expanded to encompass the role for valuing 
knowledge. Valuing and evaluation prompts the question of whether different levels 
of, or valuation of, knowledge mean different levels of identity and differential 
willingness to disclose knowledge.  This in turn may provide some explanatory power 
to behaviours in the process of knowledge transfer. 
The conclusion of the review therefore is that there is a case for the 
intervention of willingness at the individual level in the knowledge transfer process, 
and that this is made possible through the conceptual and theoretical integration of 
two discrete literatures: knowledge and identity.  In making this case we have argued 
that the understanding of knowledge transfer needs to go beyond micro level process 
to include intra-individual perspectives. 
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